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Abstract
In his refreshingly non-parochial book There Are No Such Things as The-
ories, Steven French develops an ontology and an account of representation
for the Partial Structures View in the philosophy of science as a competitor
to the logical empiricists’ Received View. I argue that formally and practi-
cally, the two views are on a par, and that French just needs to take a few
more steps with his ontology and account of representation to arrive at the
logical empiricists’ positions.
1 From set theory and partial structures to predicate
logic
The story of the Semantic View is one of rapprochement. Using set or model
theory for the formalization of theories and their relations to experiments, the
Semantic View was to have greater expressive strength while being less dependent
on language than the Syntactic View, which uses formalizations in predicate logic.
But the alleged greater language independence of the Semantic View turned out
to be nothing of the sort (Halvorson 2013; Lutz 2014, §3), and the two views
turned out to be intertranslatable (da Costa and Chuaqui 1988; Hudetz 2017).
The Partial Structures View was developed French and others as a generaliza-
tion of the model theoretic variant of the Semantic View and as a more powerful
competitor to the Syntactic View, and specifically its logical empiricist variant,
the Received View (French and Ladyman 1999). Again, intertranslatability proofs
followed: Partial structures are expressible as sets of set-theoretic structures (Lutz
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2019, §3) and hence also syntactically, and they can even be expressed in the for-
malism of the Received View (Lutz 2015, §5). Formally, then, nothing stands in
the way of an alliance of the Partial Structures View and the Received View.
French (10) notes that type theory, the predicate logic most often assumed in
the Received View, “can capture (much of) the kinds of mathematics we find in
science”, but goes on to claim that “it is for the aforementioned reason of imprac-
ticality, at least partly, that we don’t generally come across this kind of formaliza-
tion in scientific practice itself” (11). This is no reason for preferring axiomatic set
theory over type theory, however, since “those familiar with both type theory
and axiomatic set theory recognize that in some ways the former provides a more
natural vehicle than the latter for formalizing what mathematicians actually do”
(Andrews 2002, xii). Accordingly, we don’t generally come across set-theoretic
axiomatizations in scientific practice itself, either. The reason is probably one of
which French (cf. Ch. 9) is keenly aware: The goals of scientists (including math-
ematicians) are different from those of logicians and philosophers of science. As
Mermin (1993, 804) puts it regarding physicists, they are “simply less willing than
philosophers to suffer through a few pages of dreary analysis to prove something
they never doubted in the first place”. Practically, then, nothing stands in the way
of an alliance of the Partial Structures View and the Received View, either.
French (43) himself concludes that in the competition between the Syntactic
and the Semantic View (specifically the Partial Structures View), we have reached
“the point where differences that previously seemed stark, no longer appear so”.
But he maintains that “the latter offers a more straightforward ‘handle’ on such
relations as are claimed to hold when it comes to representation. In my opinion,
there are certain pragmatic advantages that accrue at the level of the philosophy
of science from adopting the structuralist framework” (70). Accordingly, in his
wide-ranging and wonderfully non-parochial There Are No Such Things as Theories,
French uses the Partial Structures View for developing an account of representa-
tion and a new ontology (or rather the eponymous non-ontology) for theories.
In the remainder of this contribution, I want to celebrate French’s first steps
towards a rapprochement between the Received and the Partial Structures View,
and argue for the practicality of the Received View. I also want to show that
French’s views on ontology and representation have developed towards the logical
empiricists’ views as well, and I want to prod him further along on this way.
2 On how we represent the world
Some of the perceived impracticalities of using predicate logic for representing
the world (or theories, if one assumes that they exist) stem from a problematic
assumption about the relation of predicate logic, set theory, and the world. For
instance, French (47) follows Thomson-Jones (2006) in claiming that a syntactic
description only provides us with
‘a perfectly good tool for picking out a collection of mathematical
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Figure 2: Another way in which representations do not work.
models’ (ibid., p. 532). And the representational character of the lat-
ter is precisely what the advocates of the Semantic Approach need
to focus on if they are to maintain the aversion to all the linguistic
issues besetting the Syntactic view and stay close to scientific practice
(ibid., pp. 533–4).
So the syntactic description is formally interpreted by a mathematical model,
i.e., a set-theoretic structure, which in turn represents the set-theoretic world
(figure 1). The intertranslatability proofs listed above also suggest this picture,
because they usually consist solely of proofs that set theoretic structures can be
determined up to isomorphism by sentences of predicate logic. But these proofs
leave out the inverse direction because it is obvious: Descriptions in predicate
logic are determined up to logical equivalence by their set theoretic models (cf.
Lutz 2014, §2). So French and Thomson-Jones could just as well speak of set the-
ory providing a perfectly good tool for picking out a collection of mathematical
models (given in type theory).
Another problematic but slightly more realistic assumption, suggested by the
term ‘Semantic View’, is that both predicate logic and set theory describe a set-
theoretic world (figure 2). But this confuses a model with the real thing: It hap-
pens to be that, when modeling the relation of predicate language and the world,
the world is often modeled in a set theoretic meta-language, and the relation is
modeled as a formal interpretation. When modeling the relation of set theory
and the world, the world is often modeled in a set theoretic meta-language as
well, and the relation is modeled as a morphism. Unsurprisingly, this connection
seems much easier, even though it is just an artifact of the choice of the language
in which the world is modeled (cf. Sarkar 1992, §§12-13). But even when stacking
the deck in favor of set theory like this, set theory provides no advantage over
predicate logic in questions of representation (Lutz 2014, §4).
Both formal interpretations and morphisms are only very impoverished mod-
els of the actual relation between language and the (non-set-theoretic) world with
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Figure 3: How representations work.
all its vaguenesses and vagaries, which is analyzed in the philosophy of language.
And both predicate logic and set theory are just two different languages for de-
scribing the world (figure 3), with essentially the same troubles.
French (71–72) suggests an immersion–inference–interpretation account of
how structures (which may describe theories or appearances) relate to the world.
In the immersion stage, a mapping (explicated as a partial isomorphism) is es-
tablished between the empirical set-up of the target system (which thus must be
described by a partial structure) and the representational structure (which thus
must be partial as well). In the inferential stage, consequences are drawn using the
representational structure, and in the interpretational stage, these consequences
are mapped (e. g. by a partial isomorphism) back to the target system. This map-
ping can be different from the one in the immersion stage.
This account is a formal model (figure 2) of how partial models represent
the world that stacks the deck in favor of the Partial Structures View. Still, as an
anonymous reader suggested, “there is nothing to stop the Syntactic Approach
from accommodating these [ . . . ] aspects”. French (72, n. 37) responds that then
it is “up to an advocate of that approach to go ahead and do it!” Indeed: Since
partially isomorphic partial structures are partial models of the same sentences,
i.e., the same sentences are partially true in each (Bueno 2000, 279–280; Lutz
2019, claim 6), one can ignore the representational structure and just describe the
partial structure T of the target system in predicate logic. This can be done by de-
scribing the set of the T -normal structures, which are model-theoretic structures
and thus can be described by a set Σ of sentences (or set thereof) in type the-
ory. If one wants to remain in a first order language (since partial structures are
first order structures), one can describe the partial structure by its diagram D(T )
(Mikenberg, da Costa, and Chuaqui 1986, definition 6). French does not describe
in detail how to draw inferences from the partial representational structure R,
but it seems reasonable that the inferences consist in determining which claims
are partially true in the partial structure, or which structures are R-normal. The
R-normal structures are (up to isomorphism) the models of Σ . The sentences
4
Sebastian Lutz French on Theories and Representation
partially true in R are those first-order sentences ϕ in the vocabulary of T that
are compatible with Σ , since these are true in a model of Σ and thus in an R-
normal structure. Mikenberg, da Costa, and Chuaqui (1986, corollary 11) show
that these are also the sentences compatible with D(T ). In the interpretation
stage, each of the inferred sentences ϕ restricts the possible partial structures to
those in which ϕ is partially true, and each inferred R-normal structure restricts
the possible partial structures to those which are partially isomorphic to a partial
structure S for which the inferred R-normal structure is S-normal. The partial
isomorphism for the R-normal structures is necessary because French allows for
different mappings in the immersion and interpretation stages. For sentences ϕ,
no such detour is necessary because they do not distinguish between partially
isomorphic structures.
This accommodation of the immersion–inference–interpretation account in
the Syntactic View may seem baroque, but only because it includes a sketch of an
equivalence proof. The actual account is as straightforward as can be: Describe the
target system in type theory or through a diagram, infer any first-order sentence
(in the same vocabulary) that is consistentwith the description, and then interpret
that sentence, possibly differently than in the description of the target system.
Note the gain from phrasing the immersion–inference–interpretation ac-
count syntactically: For one, it becomes clear how this account relates to the
standard account of inference known from the philosophy of language and used
in the Received View (e. g. Carnap 1939, §§23–24). The standard account consists
of the description of the system in a language with a fixed interpretation, the
inference of conclusions entailed by that description, and the interpretation of
those conclusions. French’s account deviates in two ways: First, the inferential
stage involves consistency rather than entailment; this is the result of choosing
partial truth rather than truth. Second, the description of the target system can
be interpreted differently than the conclusions.
Another gain achieved from the syntactic formulation is a deeper analysis
of the two deviant features. The first feature amounts to a change of the ques-
tion: Rather than enquiring what we can be certain about given the information
we have about the target system, we are now enquiring what could be the case
given the information we have about the target system. Thus, the standard ac-
count and French’s account complement each other nicely. The second feature of
French’s account amounts to a reinterpretation of the meaning of the non-logical
constants used in the description of the target system after the inference is drawn.
This possible reinterpretation loses a lot of information (only information that
is invariant under partial isomorphism is retained), unless the two partial isomor-
phisms restrict each other in some way. Formally, this second feature is described
by Hempel (1965, 435–436) as a syntactic isomorphism, a bijection between the
non-logical constants of a set of sentences (where constants are assumed to have
a fixed interpretation). Hempel suggests that analogical models are governed by
laws that are syntactically isomorphic to the laws of the target system. How this
relates to the scientific representation of one and the same target system remains
5
Sebastian Lutz French on Theories and Representation
to be seen.
3 On whether there are theories
While French’s account of representation is similar to that of the logical empiri-
cists’ Received View, French’s discussion of the ontology of theories is utterly
alien to the views of the logical empiricists, who (with the notable exception of
Feigl [1950]) famously disavowed metaphysics and never tried to determine what
a theory is (Lutz 2012b, §5.2). Carnap (1950) in particular claimed that whether
some theoretical, and in particular abstract, entity exists is determined by the con-
ventional choice of the linguistic framework inwhich to discuss it existence. Thus,
within a linguistic framework, one can answer the “internal” question whether
theories exist by checking the framework’s formal features and, if necessary, make
empirical enquiries. But the “external” question about whether some linguistic
framework is correct has no answer. One can only meaningfully ask whether the
framework is expedient for the task at hand (cf. Lutz 2012a, 190). Hence the logi-
cal empiricist answer to the external question “What are theories?” (49) is not that
“a theory is the logico-linguistic entity T C ” (4), where T C is the axiomatization
of the theory. It is: “Whatever you choose for your linguistic framework.”
French (186–188, 219–223) dissolves the problem of the essence of theories
in a different way: The problem of how theories, understood as abstract objects,
can be created when abstract objects cannot, and the difficulty of finding a uni-
versally accepted criterion of identity for theories let him conclude that there are
no theories. To account for our talk of theories, French follows Ross Cameron in
distinguishing between two languages: Ontologese, in which statements about x
can only be made true by x, and ordinary English, in which statements about x
can be made true by x or something else. In Ontologese, the statement ‘Newto-
nian mechanics is indeterministic’ is not true because Newtonian mechanics does
not exist. In ordinary English, ‘Newtonian mechanics is indeterministic’ is made
true by the practices of scientists and philosophers of science (189–193, 236–239).
Carnap (1950) would be happy with the two languages, that is, the two lin-
guistic frameworks. He would disagree, of course, with the view that only On-
tologese describes what the world is really like. And that would be reasonable,
because French’s arguments for Ontologese (against the existence of theories) al-
ready rely on ontological assumptions: The first argument assumes, for instance,
that the extension of ‘is the same theory as’ is to be invariant across contexts,
and the second argument assumes that abstract objects are not created. Both as-
sumptions can be jettisoned by changing the linguistic framework: ‘x is the same
theory as y’ can be replaced by ‘theory x is equivalent to theory y in context
z’ (cf. Douven and Decock 2010) and one can assume that abstract objects can
be created, as long as one changes the rest of the linguistic framework so that
it stays consistent and empirically adequate. It seems that since French accepts
a revisionary ontology regarding theories because of prior commitments regard-
6
Sebastian Lutz French on Theories and Representation
ing abstract objects, he could just as well accept a revisionary ontology regarding
abstract objects because of prior commitments regarding theories.
4 Rapprochement
So we end up with a Partial Structures View whose formalism can be in principle
and in practice be wholly expressed in the formalism of the Received View, and
whose application to inferences about target systems is, but for one unexplained
oddity, complementary to the application of the Received View. French’s view
further allows the possibility of speaking as a realist and as an antirealist about
theories, just as Carnap assumes, and only disagrees with the logical empiricists,
or at least Carnap, in assuming that the only ontologically correct language is the
one according to which theories do not, and theoretical entities do exist. Once
French views this assumption as a choice, it will be my pleasure to welcome him
to the fold of logical empiricism.
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